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DONNELLY CORP. v. FLACCOMIO
Judge Rhynhart, of the Peoples' Court, held that an
officer who incurred personal liability by contracting in
the name of a corporation during the time its charter was
forfeited should not have the right to escape such liability
by electing to reinstate the corporation. On the other hand,
there is little reason to give the creditor the election of
suing either the agent or the corporation, once the latter
has filed its Articles of Revival. If the corporation is never
revived, the contracting agent remains liable, but once
the revival occurs, the corporation assumes the same lia-
bility it would have had if the charter had remained in
effect. If the charter had not been forfeited, the creditor
would have no such election. It seems unnecessary to give
the creditor more than what he originally expected.29
STEPHEm M. EHUDIN
Tenants Holding Over - Effect Of Election And
Negotiation By Landlord
Donnelly Adver. Corp v. Flaccomio1
The tenant and its predecessors had leased certain prem-
ises since April, 1947 under an original three year lease
and three successive one year leases all on the same terms.
On November 16, 1955, appellant, the tenant, acquired the
interests of the original tenant in the lease which was to
expire on March 20, 1956. On February 29, 1956 tenant wrote
to the appellee-landlord, confirming a previous verbal offer
made by tenant for renewal of the lease at a lower rent
for a five year term. On March 12, landlord's attorney
answered that his client did not wish to lease for less rent
than the previous years. Three days after the lease expired,
March 23, the tenant wrote:
" 'Due to the fact that the present lease has expired,
and as you are aware, we are attempting to renegotiate
a new lease with you.
"'We will continue on the same rental basis from
month to month until such time as we can come to
some agreement as to the future.
,""It can not be considered a hardship that the parties should be held
to their common understanding." Held v. Crosthwaite, 260 F. 613, 617
(2d Cir. 1919).
'216 Md. 113, 140 A. 2d 165 (1958).
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"'Check for one month is enclosed.' "2
Shortly thereafter on March 30, landlord's attorney
replied:
"'Your lease has expired and I have authorized ***
[the landlord] to deposit the one check which pays
for the current month, but * * * [the landlord] desires
me to inform you that she is not willing for you to
continue on a month to month basis, but she will rent
year to year.
" 'Please arrange to sign a lease for a year or re-
move your property from the premises.... '"I
The parties failed to arrive at a rental agreement, and
when tenant paid rent for the period from April 20 to May
20, he notified landlord of his intention to vacate on May
20, 1956. On the theory that tenant was holding over and
the landlord could elect to treat him as a tenant from year
to year, the landlord brought this action to recover two
months rent. Tenant contended that the negotiations exist-
ing at the expiration of the lease negated any election at
that time and, in addition, the acceptance of the check
should be treated as an acceptance of the offer made by the
tenant to create a month to month tenancy.
The trial court accepted the landlord's contention and,
based upon an implied lease for another year, awarded
the landlord two months rent and costs.
In affirming the judgment of the lower court for the
landlord, the Court of Appeals found that the parties were
not actually engaged in negotiation when the lease ex-
pired and that the landlord was entitled to treat this
tenant as holding over. At his election he could hold
tenant for another year or treat him as a trespasser
and eject him. The Court also held that acceptance of
a month's rent from a tenant holding over did not create
a month to month tenancy even though an offer to that
effect by the tenant accompanied the rent. The repudiation
of the offer to rent on a month to month basis precluded
the creation of a new tenancy.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Prescott and Chief Judge
Brune considered the correspondence indicative of nego-
'Ibid., 119.
'Ibid., 119.
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tiations, emphasizing the fact that in the letter of the land-
lord's attorney on March 30, the attorney did not deny
negotiations as stated in the tenant's previous letter, but
accepted the check and stated that the landlord "is not
willing for you [tenant] to continue on a month to month
basis". The dissent questioned how the tenant could "con-
tinue" on a month to month basis if he was not in that
status when the check was tendered.
In early Maryland decisions, a tenant holding over was
held for a renewal of the lease on the basis of an express
or implied contract. In this the court accepted the English
Rule which requires an agreement between the parties
but is most liberal in finding contractual intent.5 More
recently, however, the Court of Appeals has adopted the
American Rule giving to the landlord the option of treat-
ing the tenant holding over as a trespasser or a tenant
under a new year to year lease.6 This rule gives tenants no
choice if they hold over,7 and pending the landlord's elec-
tion, they remain on the land as tenants at sufferance. 8
It is generally accepted that the burden of evidencing
the election within a reasonable time is upon the landlord,
and the election must in some manner be made known to
the tenant.9 He may elect by formal language or by acts
effecting that result. 0 However by inaction or silence the
landlord may lose his privilege of election, and the pre-
' Supra, n. 1, ds. op. 128, 129. Bracketed material added.
5Hobbs v. Batory, 86 Md. 68, 70, 37 A. 713 (1897) ; Biggs v. Stueler, 93
Md. 100, 48 A. 727 (1901).
0 Fetting Etc. Co. v. Waltz, 160 Md. 50, 152 A. 434 (1930). For a discussion
of the difference between the two doctrines, see Note, Effect of a Tenant
for Years' Holding Over, 3 Wis. L. Rev. 37 (1924).
1 1 TIFFANY, Rm.&L PROPEaTY (3rd ed. 1939) 282:
"It is somewhat surprising that the courts of this country, which
have ordinarily shown a desire to mould the law in favor of the tenant
rather -than the landlord, should have originated and generally adopted
a rule, the tendency of which is, in many cases, to operate with con-
siderable severity upon a tenant. . . . However, it has been said
that notwithstanding the rule imposes a penalty upon the individual
tenant wrongfully holding over, 'a sound and rational 'basis is found
for its adoption in the fact that it ultimately operates for the benefit
of tenants as a class by its tendency to secure the agreed surrender
of 'terms to incoming tenants who have severally yielded possession
of other premises in anticipation of promptly entering into possession
of the new, thus making for confidence and certainty in leasehold
transactions."
851 C.J.S. 779, Landlord and Tenant, §175.
"Rose v. Congdon, 72 R.I. 21, 47 A. 2d 857, 860 (1946).
"ODragun v. Connolly, 2 N.J. Misc. 727, 125 A. 575 (1924).
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sumption of new tenancy will be made." The landlord may
make only one choice, and having elected he is bound and
may not afterward change his position. 2 The acceptance
of rent by the landlord after the right to repossession of
the land has accrued is inconsistent with the contention
that the tenant continues in the status of a trespasser. 3
Under such circumstances the receipt of rent raises a pre-
sumption of waiver by the landlord of his right to treat
the tenant as a trespasser. 4 The presumption seems to be
rebuttable however, and a landlord who has expressly in-
dicated to a tenant that he will not renew the tenancy
under the terms of the lease will not be held to have con-
sented to the renewal or extension merely because after
the tenant has held over the landlord accepts rent from
him.'"
It appears that even though the landlord in this case
accepted the check tendered by the tenant as rent for the
period of holding over, he cannot be presumed to have
elected to renew the term because of the tenor of the letter
which he forwarded to tenant on March 30. The check,
however, does not appear to be merely a payment of rent,
n Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. West, 57 Ohio St. 161, 49 N.E. 344, 345 (1897) ;
"Very slight acts on the part of the landlord, as a short lapse of time,
are sufficient to conclude his election, and make the occupant his
tenant."
u Peck v. Christman, 94 Ill. App. 435 (1900). But when the presumption
has arisen, it may be rebutted. See Rainwater v. Preas, 32 Tenn. App.
79, 221 S.W. 2d 829, 830 (1949) :
"Where the circumstances appear to indicate an intention not to ter-
minate the relationship the burden is upon the lessor to rebut the
presumption of an intention to extend the lease beyond the term. The
presumption is rebuttable and not conclusive."
Hall v. Myers, 43 Md. 446 (1876).
Snee, Acceptance of Rent as Waiver of Notice, 17 Fordham L. Rev. 88
(1948).
Kennedy v. Kenderian, 187 Misc. 861, 69 N.Y.S. 2d 121, 123 (1946):
"It is undoubtedly true that sentences and phrases can be excerpted
from a large number of cases in many jurisdictions, which, standing
by themselves, sustain tenant's position. These statements, taken out
of their context, would make it appear that an acceptance of rent, by
itself, irrevocably binds the landlord despite any other considerations.
"A careful reading of these cases shows that they do not actually
hold as strongly as tenant contends. The rule . . . seems to be . ..
'While. . . the payment by and acceptance of rent from a tenant hold-
ing over is generally held to create a tenancy for another term and
to renew all rights and obligations incident 'to the relationship of land-
lord and tenant under the original lease, the presumption so raised is
not conclusive but may 'be overcome by other circumstances attending
the transaction which show that such was not the Intention of the
parties.' "
See also 45 A.L.R. 2d 827, 842.
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but an integral component of an "offer" to lease on a month
to month basis made in tenant's letter of March 23. The
fact that the landlord-tenant relationship must arise out
of a contract is well established.16 The letter of the tenant,
Donnelly, dated March 23, appears to meet the require-
ments of an offer,17 and therefore the basic question ap-
pears: Can the landlord accept a check tendered in con-
nection with an offer to lease on a month to month basis
by the tenant, but at the same time decline the offer and
treat the offeror as a tenant at sufferance requiring him
to elect either to sign a written lease on a year to year
basis or vacate the premises?
Acceptance of the offer could not have reasonably been
implied from Flaccomio's conduct.'" The modification of
the offer by Flaccomio in the letter to Donnelly on March
30 rejected the original offer and appears to have had the
effect of a counter-offer.19 A flat rejection of this offer by
Flaccomio would have terminated the existing negotiations,
but clearly by proposing new terms in the letter Flaccomio
did make a counter-offer which operated to renew or con-
tinue negotiations.2 1
Both the majority and dissent in the Donnelly case ap-
pear to agree that the acceptance of the check did not con-
stitute an acceptance of the tenant's offer. The issue be-
tween them was whether the conduct did establish nego-
tiations between the parties, thereby precluding the land-
lord from treating the tenant as holding over for another
term. As was pointed out in the majority opinion:
"... the landlord is entitled to treat the tenant as a
tenant holding over for another term of one year un-
less the tenant has definitely established one of two
circumstances: either (i) that the landlord consented
... or (ii) that the parties were actually engaged in
10Regan v. Rogers, 68 R.I. 319, 27 A. 2d 302 (1942). In this case a new
landlord wrote to the tenant telling him he had purchased the property
and would call for the rent on the first of the month. The tenant did not
answer the letter nor pay rent, and the court held the landlord's letter
was only an offer. Since this offer was not accepted no landlord-tenant
relationship existed and the tenant therefore was a tenant at sufferance
entitled to statutory notice to quit. See also 51 C.J.S. 510, Landlord and
Tenant, §2 b.
17 12 AM. JUR. 524, Contracts, §26.
181 WILMSTo, CONTRACTS (3rd ed. 1957), §90.
Op. cit. ibid., §77.
01 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) 66, §60; 12 Am. Jur. 543, Contracts,
§53.
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negotiations as to a renewal of the lease when the pre-
vious term ended. 2
1
Bouvier defines negotiation as "[t]he deliberation which
takes place between the parties touching a proposed agree-
ment. '22 As to the nature of negotiations:
"To 'negotiate' is to transact business; to treat with
another respecting a purchase and sale; to hold inter-
course; to bargain or trade; to conduct communications
or conferences. It is that which passes between par-
ties... in the course of or incident to the making of a
contract; .... The mere offer or solicitation, which
meets with prompt refusal or rejection ... cannot be
regarded as negotiations within the meaning of the
contract. ' '2a
When the tenant holds over pending completion of
negotiations, by express or tacit consent of the landlord,
the landlord is usually not permitted to treat the tenant as
holding over for another term.24 It appears in this case
that the tenant was attempting to establish "negotiations"
during the correspondence between the parties and in fact
stated in his letter of March 23 that they were attempting
to renegotiate for a new lease. Whether the landlord recog-
nized the significance of this statement is unknown, but
by (1) accepting the check, (2) counter-offering to rent on
a year to year basis and (3) not refuting the fact that the
parties were negotiating for a new lease, it appears that
the landlord's conduct precluded him from afterwards ex-
ercising his election, as the dissent contended. If the tenant
occupied the premises pending negotiations for a new
lease, a tenancy at will may be presumed, 25 and the tenant
"Donnelly Adver. Corp. v. Flaccomio, 216 Md. 113, 122, 140 A. 2d 165
(1958): see also Tonkel v. Riteman, 163 Miss. 216, 141 So. 344 (1932).
S2 BouvizR's LAw DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 1914) 2331.
"Werner v. Hendricks, 121 Pa. Super. 46, 182 A. 748, 749. 750 (1936).
Leggett v. Louisiana Purchase Exposition Co.. 157 Mo. App. 108, 137
S.W. 893 (1911). In footnote 1 to the dissenting opinion of the Donnelly
case, supra n. 1, dis. op. 128, this point Is conceded by everyone and it is
stated there that a tenant who holds over pending negotiations with ex-
press or tacit consent of the landlord does not afford the landlord an
opportunity to treat the holding over as a lease for another term.
251 C.J.S. 769, Landlord and Tenant, §164. For a discussion of the
difference between the tenant at sufferance and the tenant at will, see,
Note, Notice of Termination Required to Terminate a Periodic Tenancy
Implied Under a Void Lease, 9 Md. L. Rev. 362, 364 (1948), and Gem,
Inc. v. Felton, 341 Pa. 96, 17 A. 2d 386 (1914).
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is not subject to the arbitrary election of the landlord but
may terminate the relationship and vacate with only 30
days statutory notice.28
EDWARD J. FisHER III
Holder Of A Conditional Sales Contract As An
"Encumbrancer" Within The Meaning
Of Recording Statutes
Automobile Accep. Corp. v. Universal Corp.'
On July 5, 1955, Suburban Nash, Inc. sold by contract
of conditional sale an automobile to Thomas, and he on
that date took possession of the auto. On the same day
Suburban Nash assigned the contract to appellee, Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corporation. The following day, Suburban
Nash induced Thomas to execute a second conditional sales
contract covering the same auto. This contract, together
with a duplicate title to the auto obtained fraudulently
from the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, was immedi-
ately assigned to appellant, Automobile Acceptance Cor-
poration. Neither contract was recorded until seven months
later when Suburban Nash was in financial difficulties.
Then, Auto Acceptance recorded its contract first, and
C.I.T. recorded three days later.
C.I.T. brought this suit seeking a declaratory judgment
or decree establishing the superiority of its claim over that
of Auto Acceptance.
The Circuit Court found that Section 2 of Article 8 of
The Code of 19512 relating to assignments of accounts re-
ceivable or contracts with or without notification to the
debtor of the assignment was controlling, and therefore
gave a decree for C.I.T. The Court of Appeals reversed
by a 3-2 decision. The majority of the Court of Appeals
rejected the assignment statute as controlling, but found
"Charter & P.L.L. of Balto. City (1949) §731; Darling Shops v. Balto.
Center, 191 Md. 289, 60 A. 2d 669, 6 A.L.R. 2d 677 (1948) Following ex-
tended negotiations the tenancy may be determined by the measuring period
of the rent. In Schilling v. Klein, 41 Ill. App. 209 (1921) the tenant held
over, paid rent, and negotiated for a new lease. Terms were never agreed
upon and the Court held 'that the negotiations were inconsistent with the
previous lease and since the tenant was in possession paying a monthly
rent, that in itself created a month to month tenancy.
1216 Md. 344, 139 A. 2d 683 (1958).
'Now 1 MD. CoDE (1957) Art. 8, §1.
